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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXPANSION OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
FOR VIOLENT AND DANGEROUS OFFENDERS
Justin Enget
INTRODUCTION
Involuntary civil commitment for the mentally ill has a long his-
tory in American law.' In recent years, however, there has been a
proliferation of statutes providing for the indefinite civil commitment
of persons convicted of sex offenses following their prison sentences.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas's Sexually
Violent Predator Act ("SVPA")2 in Kansas v. Hendricks,3 thus implicitly
upholding similar statutory schemes in other states and paving the
way for the adoption of such laws throughout the nation.
Although the Kansas SVPA covers only a narrow subset of criminal
offenders (those who commit violent sexual offenses), many com-
mentators have observed that the statute and the Hendricks decision
have the potential to be extended to other types of offenders, and
perhaps even to all criminals. These concerns have become all the
more salient in recent times, as fear of terrorism is likely to foster a
political climate conducive to the expansion of broader mechanisms
for social control of dangerous persons.
This comment begins in Part I by providing a detailed examina-
tion of the Hendricks decision. Part II discusses the potential implica-
tions of Hendricks. As many scholars have recognized, Hendricks pro-
vides no doctrinal limitation on the expansion of civil commitment,
leaving open the possibility that civil commitment could be utilized as
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a mechanism to incapacitate a broad range of offenders. Part III ex-
plores justifications for the expansion of civil commitment. I argue
that, if accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards, an ex-
panded civil commitment system may be a desirable alternative to our
current retributive criminal justice system. Parts IV and V discuss
possible constitutional limitations on the indefinite expansion of in-
voluntary civil commitment. These limitations are examined in the
context of a hypothetical representing the broadest possible expan-
sion of involuntary civil commitment. I assume that a state, called
State X, passes a statute that discards its current system of criminal
justice and replaces it with a system predicated on involuntary civil
commitment for virtually all types of violent offenders. I discuss both
the legal authority that may support State X's decision to pass this
statute, and the potential constitutional impediments to its enact-
ment.
I. THE KANSAS SVPA AND THE HENDRiCKS DECISION
The Kansas SVPA provides for the indefinite civil commitment of
persons adjudged to be "sexually violent predators."4 The Act defines
a "sexually violent predator" as "any person who has been convicted
of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence."5 "Mental
abnormality" is defined as a "congenital or acquired condition affect-
ing the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person
to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such per-
son a menace to the health and safety of others."6
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Kansas
SVPA in Kansas v. Hendricks.7 Leroy Hendricks, a diagnosed pedo-
phile, was the first person committed pursuant to the Kansas SVPA.
Hendricks had a long history of conviction and incarceration for sex-
ual offenses against children, beginning in 1955.8 In 1984, Hendricks
was convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-year-old
boys. He served ten years of his sentence, and was scheduled for re-
lease to a halfway house. 9 Shortly before his release, the State filed a
petition in state court seeking to civilly commit Hendricks under the
Kansas SVPA.10 The state court reserved ruling based on the Act's
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994).
5 Id.
6 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-09a02(b) (1994).
7 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Id. at 353-54.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 354.
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constitutionality, and concluded that there was probable cause to
support a finding that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator."
Hendricks then requested a jury trial to determine whether he
qualified as a sexually violent predator. During the trial, Hendricks
testified to his long history of sexual molestation." He admitted that
he "[couldn't] control the urge" to molest children, and that the only
way he could ensure that he would not sexually abuse children in the
future was "to die." 3 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hendricks was a sexually violent predator, and the trial court ordered
him committed.1
4
Hendricks appealed his commitment to the Kansas Supreme
Court. He challenged the Act's constitutionality on three bases.
First, he argued that a commitment based on a "mental abnormality"
rather than a clinically recognized "mental illness" violated substan-
tive due process. 5 Second, he claimed that his commitment violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it pun-
ished him twice for the same behavior. 6 Third, he argued that the
SVPA violated the Ex Post Facto clause because it was passed after his
conviction and increased the punishment for his criminal behavior.
7
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act's definition of "men-
tal abnormality" did not satisfy the "mental illness" requirement in
the civil commitment context, and thus the Act violated Hendricks'
substantive due process rights. 8
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Kansas Su-
preme Court. 9 Justice Thomas, speaking for a five-person majority,
rejected each of Hendricks' arguments. Justice Thomas began by
addressing the substantive due process challenge. He found that the
SVPA did not run afoul of substantive due process because the re-
quirement of a pre-commitment finding of "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" is consistent with the requirements imposed by
other civil commitment statutes that were previously upheld by the
Court.2° According to Justice Thomas, the finding of a clinically rec-
ognized "mental illness" is not a prerequisite to commitment.
Rather, legislatures have the authority to provide legal definitions for
mental health concepts that do not "mirror" those provided by the
11 Id.
12 Id. at 354-55.
13 Id. at 355.
14 Id. at 355-56.
15 Id. at 356.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 356.
19 Id. at 350.
20 Id. at 358.
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medical profession.21 Moreover, Justice Thomas observed, Hendricks
was diagnosed as suffering from pedophilia, which is classified by the
psychiatric profession as a serious mental disorder.22
Remarkably, eight of the nine Justices essentially agreed with Jus-
tice Thomas's conclusion that the Kansas SVPA's definition of "men-
23
tal abnormality" did not violate substantive due process.
Justice Thomas went on to consider whether the Kansas SVPA vio-
lated the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses. Both of these
claims turned on the same issue: whether or not confinement under
the Act constitutes punishment.24 If the government is not punishing
an individual, the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses do not
apply. Justice Thomas began by noting that Hendricks bore a heavy
burden of establishing that the Act is indeed punitive, since the Kan-
sas legislature labeled it as a civil statute. 5 Justice Thomas then cited
several reasons why Hendricks failed to satisfy this burden.
First, as a "threshold matter," the Act did not implicate either ret-
ribution or deterrence, which are the two primary goals of the crimi-
26nal justice system. 6 According to Justice Thomas, the Act was not re-
tributive because it did not seek to impose culpability for prior
criminal conduct. Instead, it merely used prior criminal conduct for
"evidentiary purposes., 27 The Act was also not functioning as a deter-
rent, because persons covered under the Act by definition suffer from
a "mental abnormality" that prevents them from exercising adequate
control over their behavior. Therefore, they cannot be deterred.
Additionally, the conditions of confinement for persons committed
under the Act mirrored those of state mental institutions, rather than
29
prisons.
21 Id. at 359.
22 Id. at 360.
2 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which agreed with the majority's conclusion
but cautioned that civil confinement should not become a mechanism for retribution or deter-
rence. See id. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion.
Id. at 373-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Part I of his opinion endorsed the majority's conclusion
that the Act did not violate substantive due process. Id. at 373-78. Parts II and III concluded
that the Act was punitive and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Id. at 395-96. Justice Ginsburgjoined Parts II and III of the dissent, but did not join Part I. Id.
at 373. Therefore, it is unclear whether or not justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority re-
garding the substantive due process claim.
24 Id. at 361.
25 Id. ("[W]e will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the
statute provides 'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'" (citing United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980))).
26 Id. at 361-62.
27 Id. at 362.
28 Id. at 362-63.
29 Id. at 363.
[Vol. 8:4
EXPANSION OF INVOL UNTARY COMMITMENT
Second, Justice Thomas rejected the argument that the potentially
indefinite duration of the confinement evidenced the state's punitive
intent. Justice Thomas found that the duration of confinement was
appropriately linked to the express purpose of the Act, which was to
confine the person until his mental abnormality no longer made him
a danger to others. °
Third, Justice Thomas found that the state's use of procedural
safeguards traditionally reserved for criminal trials did not render the
statutory proceedings criminal rather than civil.3' Instead, Justice
Thomas viewed these safeguards as demonstrating that Kansas care-
fully limited the statute to apply to a narrow class of dangerous indi-
viduals. 2
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the argument that the Act was
punitive because it did not offer legitimate treatment. He noted that
incapacitation is a legitimate end of civil law.3 Therefore, the fact
that the Act's "overriding concern" is the continued "segregation of
sexually violent offenders" was consistent with the conclusion that the
Act is civil rather than punitive.3 Moreover, Justice Thomas ob-
served, the Act included a provision stating that the state had an obli-
gation to provide treatment to individuals committed under the Act,
suggesting that treatment might be an ancillary purpose of the Act.
3 5
The fact that treatment procedures were not in place at the time
Hendricks was committed did not render the proceedings punitive,
because states have wide discretion in developing treatment regi-
36mens.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HENDRICKS DECISION
The Hendricks decision represents a substantial extension of civil
commitment jurisprudence without providing a cogent limiting prin-
ciple. 7 The Kansas SVPA, upheld by the Supreme Court, is far more
broad than traditional civil commitment statutes in the sense that it
allowed commitment to be predicated on a finding of "mental ab-
normality" rather than a clinically recognized mental illness. As Pro-
fessor Stephen Morse argues, a careful examination of Kansas's defi-
30 Id. at 363-64.
31 Id. at 364.
32 Id.
" Id. at 365-66.
U Id. at 366.
35 Id. at 367.
% Id. at 367-68.
37 See Note, Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L. REv. 259, 266
(1997) (stating that the Hendricks decision is remarkable because "the majority extended the
reach of its due process civil commitment jurisprudence without offering a cogent limiting
principle").
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nition of mental abnormality reveals that it is really not a definition of
mental abnormality at all.3 s Again, the Act defines "mental abnormal-
ity" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others."39 This definition is so broad that, if the
reference to "sexually violent offenses" is deleted, it applies to all be-
havior, both normal and abnormal.4°
To illustrate this concept, consider the following hypothetical of-
fered by Thomas J. Weilert, Hendricks' attorney.41 Weilert posed a
scenario in which an individual convicted of robbery is scheduled for
parole from prison. A victim's rights group lobbies the Kansas legis-
lature, which passes the Violent Predator Act.42 The Act defines "vio-
lent predator" as "any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of violence."43 In turn, "mental abnormality" is defined
as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or vo-
litional capacity which predisposes the person to commit violent of-
fenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others."44 A person found to be a "violent predator" may
be confined indefinitely, until it is shown that his mental abnormality
no longer makes him a danger to others.
5
As Weilert's hypothetical demonstrates, the Hendricks decision vali-
dates a civil commitment scheme that could potentially be expanded
to apply to classes of offenders besides sexual offenders. Given the
8 Morse writes:
[T]he type of mental abnormality criterion adopted by Kansas and other states, which
the Court accepted, is not only over-inclusive; it also places essentially no non-
responsibility limit on commitment. The criterion is so broad that it applies to any per-
son who commits sexual violence, and, more generally, it applies to all behavior, normal
and abnormal alike. It is not a definition of abnormality at all.
SteohenJ. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2002).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
40 Morse, supra note 38, at 1043.
41 ThomasJ. Weilert, Thoughts on the Cost of Freedom, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 17, 17-18 (1997).
42 Id. at 17.
43 Id. at 18.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See also Fred Cohen, The Law and Sexually Violent Predators-Through the Hendricks Looking
Glass, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 1-8 (Anita Schlank
& Fred Cohen eds., 1999) (suggesting that, under Hendricks, it would be doctrinally feasible to
enact a statute that provides for the involtntary civil commitment of pathological gamblers);
John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patrie Powers in Involuntary Civil
Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377, 400-01 (1998) (suggest-
ing that arsonists and women suffering from acute "premenstrual dysphoric disorder" could be
committed based on a mental abnormality formulation similar to that approved in Hendricks);
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broadness of Kansas's definition of mental abnormality, the decision
suggests that virtually all offenders likely to engage in a pattern of re-
petitive criminal conduct could be committed indefinitely. 47 This is
especially true when one considers that many researchers predict that
a sizable percentage of the current prison population may be diag-
nosed as having antisocial personality disorder, which would seem to
qualify as a "mental abnormality" under Kansas's definition.48
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
The Hendricks decision provides no doctrinal limitations on a
state's ability to expand the use of involuntary civil commitment as a
mechanism for control of dangerous persons. Many scholars have
criticized the Hendricks decision as an unjustified expansion of civil
commitment, and have argued that further expansion is dangerous to
our civil liberties and should be curtailed.49
In my view, this criticism is misplaced. Civil commitment, if ac-
companied by appropriate procedural safeguards, could provide a vi-
able and in fact desirable alternative to our current system of criminal
justice.
A primary goal of any civil commitment system is to incapacitate
dangerous persons °.5  Theoretically, the state's power to incapacitate
dangerous persons in order to protect others is difficult to debate.51
Mara Lynn Krongard, A Population At Risk: Civil Commitment of Substance Abusers After Kansas v.
Hendricks, 90 CAL. L. REV. 111 (2002) (arguing that Hendricks broadened the scope of civil
commitment and that substance abusers are particularly at risk of commitment).
47 See Introduction, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR, supra note 46, at ix-x (noting the concern
among certain mental health professionals and legal researchers that the broad definition of
"mental abnormality" may eventually be applied to include all criminals).
48 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 648 (4th ed. 1994) (reporting that various studies have found the preva-
lence of antisocial personality disorder in clinical settings to be as high as 30%, while even
higher prevalence rates have been noted in substance abuse treatment settings and prison or
forensic settings); Eric S. Janus & Lisbeth J. Nudell, Defending Sex Offender Commitment Cases, in
THE SEXUAL PREDATOR, supra note 46, at 3-1, 3-9 (describing the diagnostic criteria for antiso-
cial personality disorder as "exceedingly broad" and noting that the diagnosis could apply to up
to 80% of all prisoners); P. Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 SOC.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOL. 231, 234 (1999) (estimating that 40%-60% of the male
prison population can be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder).
49 See, e.g., Krongard, supra note 46, at 163 (criticizing the Hendricks decision as a dangerous
precedent that places individual liberty interests at substantial risk); Stephen J. Morse, Neither
Desert Nor Disease, LEGAL THEORY 265, 277 (1999) (stating that the potential expansion of the
civil commitment scheme approved in Hendricks threatens civil liberty).
50 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Jus-
tice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432-33 (2001) ("The goal of providing [protection from danger-
ous persons] underlies traditional ... commitment systems that detain persons who are dan-
gerously mentally ill or who have contagious diseases.").
See id. at 1432. ("It is difficult to deny that a society ought to be able to defend itself
against persons who will cause serious harm.").
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Indeed, it can be argued that the very purpose of government is to
ensure the safety and security of its citizens. Of course, every individ-
ual citizen has a constitutionally protected liberty interest, but that
interest can be overridden by the state's interest in ensuring commu-
nity safety.52 Therefore, if certain individuals are sufficiently danger-
ous, the state has a duty to incapacitate them for the common good.
Incapacitation is recognized as a goal of the criminal justice sys-
tem as well. However, incapacitation is better served by civil com-
mitment than by our present system of criminal justice. This is be-
cause the criminal justice system also serves the goal of retribution,
which inherently conflicts with the principle of incapacitation. Inca-
pacitation seeks to protect the community from dangerous persons
by physically confining or otherwise disabling them. Retribution,
popularly referred to as 'just deserts," seeks to inflict punishment
upon those who have committed wrongful acts in order to restore the
"moral balance."5 As Professor Paul Robinson explains, the theoreti-
cal bases of retribution and incapacitation diverge because retribu-
tion focuses on punishing past wrongdoing, while incapacitation fo-
56cuses on preventing future harm. This theoretical divide has serious
practical implications. If the focus of the criminal justice system is in-
capacitation, this suggests that punishment should be determined on
the basis of factors that accurately predict future dangerousness. On
the other hand, if the focus is on retribution, punishment should be
set according to the seriousness of the crime and the offender's
blameworthiness. Moreover, a sufficiently dangerous individual may
52 This rationale has been used to justify incapacitation of dangerous persons outside the
civil commitment context. For example, the Supreme Court has sanctioned pretrial detention
without bail of potentially dangerous offenders. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
See alsoJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-29 (1905) (upholding legislated mass vacci-
nations and approving forced quarantines even if the people targeted show no signs of illness).
The Jacobson Court commented:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society
could not exist with safety to its members.
Id. at 26.
53 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]ncapac-
itation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement.... .").
54 See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1899 (1991).
55 Id.; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (defining retribution as "the
need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral quality'").
56 Robinson, supra note 50, at 1438-41.
57 See id. Robinson rejects the notion, reflected in the Model Penal Code, that incapacita-
tion and retribution can be harmonized. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE:
PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT § 1.02(2) (1962) (listing the purposes of sentencing, including inca-
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be incapacitated although he deserves no punishment, and, likewise,
a person may be punished because he deserves it even though he is
not dangerous.
The irreconcilable differences between the theories of retribution
and incapacitation clearly suggest that the criminal justice system
should not be in the business of doing both. If faced with a choice
between the two, the criminal justice system should focus upon retri-
bution rather than incapacitation. After all, the criminal justice sys-
tem is designed to determine criminal responsibility and punish indi-
viduals found guilty of committing criminal acts; it is not designed to
accurately assess dangerousness. A civil commitment system, on the
other hand, is designed to assess dangerousness-a determination of
dangerousness is one of the prerequisites to commitment.5s There-
fore, civil commitment is the appropriate mechanism to further the
goal of incapacitation.
Most people would insist that retribution is a fundamentally im-
portant principle that must be satisfied by the state.59 However, not
everyone shares this view. Many believe that man's desire for venge-
ance can never provide a justification for punishment by the state.6°
If retribution is not a proper justification for state-inflicted punish-
ment, this suggests that the criminal justice system itself may be un-
necessary. Of course, the criminal justice system is also said to satisfy
the goal of deterrence, meaning that punishment of one person dis-
courages others from committing the same act. However, recent
scholarship has cast serious doubt on the validity of the deterrence
principle. Therefore, both of the traditional justifications for crimi-
pacitation and retribution, and directing judges to fashion sentences to further all the purposes
most effectively). In Robinson's view, furthering one goal requires sacrificing the other.
58 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 125 (1992) (noting that dangerousness is a prerequi-
site to civil confinement).
59 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart,J., concurring) ("The in-
stinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the admini-
stration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law.").
See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 295 (1986) (rejecting retribution as a legitimate
justification for punishment because today's society fails to respect the autonomy of all indi-
viduals); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 417 (1978) (suggesting that revenge-
based retribution is an unworthy justification for punishment); Steven F. Huefner, Reservations
About Retribution in a Secular Society, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 977-78 (2003) (arguing that retri-
bution is both too broad and too narrow a justification for punishment); Paul H. Robinson, The
Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of "Restorative Justice", 2003 UTAH L. REv. 375, 377-78
(2002) (explaining that advocates of restorative justice believe that "just deserts"-based punish-
ment is never an appropriate goal of the justice system).
61 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (arguing that crimi-
nal law does not deter under the conditions found in modern criminal justice systems, and ex-
pressing concern that lawmakers take the validity of deterrence for granted). Also, to the ex-
tent that there is a deterrent effect to punishment, the same effect, though unintended, should
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nal punishment are at least open to question, so an alternative system
of social control has some theoretical credibility.
Civil commitment actually has many advantages over criminal jus-
tice in terms of civil liberty. First, since dangerousness is the reason
for confinement, the state must periodically review the offender's
dangerousness and release him if it is determined that he no longer
poses a threat.62 Second, since commitment is not punitive, the con-
dition of the offender's detention should not be as harsh as the pre-
vailing conditions in prisons. 63 Third, since the offender is being de-
tained for society's benefit and not because he deserves punishment,
the type of restraint he is subjected to should be the minimum neces-
sary to ensure the public safety.64 If the individual can be sufficiently
incapacitated by means other than commitment, such as community
supervision or house arrest, then such other means should be used.
Fourth, those offenders who have conditions amenable to treatment
can be treated more readily in a commitment setting than they can
be in prison, and they also have a more plausible claim to treatment
because it may reduce the length of their confinement. In fact,
whereas rehabilitation coupled with retributive punishment has failed
miserably, 66 rehabilitation combined with incapacitation has the po-
tential to be quite successful since the two goals are theoretically
compatible.
Given these advantages, one may wonder why preventive civil com-
mitment is so controversial. One reason has already been men-
tioned. Most people instinctually believe in the principle of retribu-
tion. Accordingly, most people believe that offenders should be
punished according to what they deserve, no less and no more. An-
other major reason is that incapacitation has a major downfall-lack
of predictive accuracy.67 Although a system based upon incapacita-
tion should theoretically do a much better job of protecting commu-
nity safety than one predicated on retribution, incapacitation re-
quires that we have an accurate method of identifying those people
result from civil commitment, at least for people who are not entirely irrational or completely
unable to conform their conduct to the law.
62 Robinson, supra note 50, at 1446.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 1447.
65 Id.
66 See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
22, 25, 49 (1974) (summarizing the results of hundreds of studies of rehabilitative programs in
a prison setting, and concluding that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that
have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism," and that present strategies
cannot overcome, or even appreciably reduce, the powerful tendency for offenders to con-
tinue in criminal behavior").
67 See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Fssay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV.
113, 126 (1996) (arguing that predictions of future dangerousness are highly inaccurate).
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who are highly likely to engage in violence and who therefore can be
justifiably confined. Many people are very skeptical of the ability of
courts and psychiatrists to predict dangerousness accurately. For ex-
ample, after surveying clinical studies, Professor Morse concludes that
"the ability of mental health professionals to predict future violence
among mental patients may be better than chance, but it is still highly
inaccurate, especially if these professionals are attempting to use
clinical methods to predict serious violence. ' 68
Professor Morse is surely correct to point out the problems with
predicting dangerousness. But these problems do not doom the ex-
pansion of civil commitment. Of course, we will never be able to
predict human behavior with perfect accuracy. There will, as Morse
points out, be many "false positives" when we confine people on the
basis of dangerousness.6 9  However, this alone does not justify the
complete abandonment of preventive detention. There have been
many, many cases of perfectly innocent people being falsely convicted
70and sent to prison, or even executed. We accept the risk of errone-
ous conviction because we realize that no system is infallible, and be-
cause we believe that, on balance, society is better off having a justice
system that occasionally punishes the innocent than having no justice
system at all. We seek to minimize the risk of conviction by requiring
the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A preven-
tive detention system could similarly raise the standard of proof and
require the state to show a "high" or "extremely high" likelihood of
future dangerousness.
Moreover, methods of predicting dangerousness have significantly
improved over the years, and there is reason to believe that they can
improve further with more research . Particularly, actuarial risk as-
68 Id.
69 Id. A "false positive" refers to a person who would not commit further violent acts but is
confined nonetheless.
70 See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 36, 173-79 (1987) (summarizing the results of an extensive study of
350 erroneous convictions in capital cases, and concluding that in forty percent of the cases an
innocent person was sentenced to death and, in twenty-three of these cases, the execution was
actually carried out).
71 State supreme courts have already done this with regard to the standard necessary to jus-
tify civil commitment of sexual predators. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held
that proof that the individual is "highly likely" to engage in future acts of violence justifies civil
commitment. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 181 (Minn. 1996). Similarly, the Washington
Supreme Court stated that sexual offenders subject to commitment are those whose "likelihood
of re-offense is extremely high." In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989, 1003 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
7 Hanson explains:
[R]ecent years have seen significant advances in risk assessment procedure .... There is
no longer any serious debate about whether general criminal recidivism can be pre-
dicted among general criminal populations. Those offenders most likely to reoffend
have been identified by risk factors such as a history of criminal behavior, antisocial per-
sonality/psychopathy, a young age, antisocial peers, and procriminal attitudes. ...
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sessments73 have proven to be especially promising, and have yielded
significant correlations with sexual, violent, and general recidivism. 74
Therefore, skeptics of risk assessment may overestimate the potential
number of "false positives" that would result in a system of preventive
detention. Additionally, many studies assessing the accuracy of dan-
gerousness predictions may overestimate the number of "false posi-
tives." This is because studies of recidivism usually measure recidi-
vism in terms of subsequent convictions within a given time frame.
However, much crime goes undetected,75 so many individuals identi-
fied by studies as "false positives" may have actually committed violent
acts during the duration of the study, or may commit violent acts af-
ter the study period ends.
Finally, the phenomenon of "false positives" seems less troubling
when one considers the type of individuals who may comprise the
false positives. A system of involuntary civil commitment would fea-
ture incapacitation as its central mechanism for promoting commu-
nity safety. However, civil confinement would be a last resort, re-
served for only those people who have the highest likelihood of
committing violent acts. While the number of people involuntarily
committed under the system would undoubtedly be much greater
than the number of people currently committed, I envision a system
in which the vast majority of offenders are dealt with through the use
of less intrusive means. For offenders who are dangerous but not
highly dangerous, supervised release or house arrest may be sufficient
to ensure community safety. Nonviolent offenders would be dealt
with exclusively through the use of non-physical restraints such as
fines, restitution, community service, and community-based treat-
ment. Restorative justice principles and processes would play a much
more important role in the system than it does in our current crimi-
R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Risk Assessment, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR, supra note
46, at 8-1, 8-2.
73 The difference between actuarial and clinical assessments has been explained as follows:
"In the clinical method the decision-maker combines or processes information in his or her
head. In the actuarial or statistical method the human judge is eliminated and conclusions rest
solely on empirically established relations between data and the condition or event of interest."
Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus ActuarialJudgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1668 (1989).
74 See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Assessment with Sex Offenders:
Accuracy, Admissibility, and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1453-59 (2003) (summariz-
ing the results of meta-analyses, and concluding that actuarial assessments of risk are superior to
clinical assessments and should be admissible in civil commitment proceedings for sexually vio-
lent predators).
75 Criminologists refer to the difference between recorded crime and actual crime as the
"dark figure" of crime. See generally Albert D. Biderman & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., On Exploring the
"Dark Figure" of Crime, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1967) (discussing the conflict-
ing views of "realists" and "institutionalists" with respect to the "dark figure" of crime).
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76nal justice system. In short, the system would be more cost-effective
and less harsh than the criminal justice system, and would have the
potential to promote greater community safety. Yes, there would be
false positives committed unjustifiably, but the false positives would
not be the check forgers, petty thieves,77 or minor drug offenders.
Rather, they would be the one-time murderers, rapists, and child mo-
lesters who are confined indefinitely despite their lack of continuing
dangerousness. It would be difficult for a retributivist to argue with
this result.
It is time to face the reality that our incarceration-based criminal
justice system is not working. The United States imprisons more of its
citizens than any other country in the Western world, yet has among
the highest crime rates.78 We continue to punish people for violating
the law by throwing them in prison, yet our streets become no safer
in the process. "The instinct for retribution" may be "part of the na-
ture of man,"79 but we must begin to consider the possibility that our
instinct has led us astray. We need to start thinking creatively about
alternatives to our criminal justice system. A system of involuntary
civil commitment for violent and dangerous offenders, combined
76 For an argument that restorative justice should replace retributive punishment, see John
Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1727 (1999). Braithwaite defines restorative justice as the "process of bringing together the
stakeholders (victims, offenders, communities) in search of a justice that heals the hurt of
crime, instead of responding to hurt with more hurt." Id. at 1728-29. This process uses tech-
niques such as "victim-offender mediation, sentencing circles, and family-group confer-
ences... ." Robinson, supra note 60, at 375. Studies have shown that restorative processes can
both be effective in reducing recidivism and improving people's perception of the fairness of
the adjudication system. Id. at 376. Braithwaite believes that restorative justice should be used
as a first resort, and deterrence and incapacitation should be used as back-up strategies when it
fails. Braithwaite, supra, at 1742. I believe that restorative processes can be very effective for
dealing with particular types of offenses, and I agree that it should be the first resort for many
minor offenses and property-based offenses. However, restorative processes are inappropriate
for serious violent offenses, and these types of offenders should be incapacitated for the safety
of the community.
77 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). In Rummel, the defendant had been convicted
under a Texas "recidivist" statute for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Because he had two
prior felony convictions-one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods
or services, and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36-he was sen-
tenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Id. at 266. The Supreme Court held that Rummel's
sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id. at 285.
78 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION 33 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) ("Compared to other countries, this [the U.S.
rate of incarceration] is by far the highest rate of incarceration relative to population in the
Western world."); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Division for Policy Analysis and
Public Affairs, Seventh United Nations Annual Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Jus-
tice Systems, covering the period 1998-2000, Table 2.01, 16.01, available at http://www.unodc.org/
pdf/crime/seventhsurvey/7sv.pdf (last modified Mar. 31, 2004) (listing crime and incarcera-
tion rates for seventy-two countries).
79 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart,J., concurring).
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with non-penal sanctions and restorative processes for others, may
provide a viable alternative. The following sections explore whether
such a system would comport with the Constitution.
IV. STATE X HYPOTHETICAL
A. Civil Commitment Act
In order to examine the limits of a state's authority to expand its
use of civil commitment, I present the following hypothetical, which
is intended to represent the maximum possible expansion of civil
commitment.
Assume that State X passes a statute, called the Civil Commitment
Act, which effectively abolishes its present system of criminal justice
and replaces it with a system of social control predicated upon invol-
untary civil commitment for the majority of offenders. The statute
adopted by State X provides that all persons currently incarcerated
who meet the state's definition of mental abnormality, which is
analogous to Kansas's definition (absent the words "sexually vio-, 80
lent") , will be indefinitely committed, subject to periodic review on a
yearly basis.
The Act further provides that, following the time the statute goes
into effect, "serious criminal offenses" (defined as felonies and Class
A misdemeanors) will be converted into "commitment predicates."
When a person is charged with a commitment predicate, a state pro-
ceeding is initiated in which a jury is required to determine whether
the person committed the act, and if so, whether the person has a
mental abnormality that renders him or her a danger to the health
and safety of others. If both questions are answered in the affirma-
tive, the person will be indefinitely committed subject to periodic re-
view on a yearly basis. Persons who do not qualify for commitment
under the Act will be dealt with through the use of non-penal sanc-
tions such as fines, probation, reparation, and, where appropriate,
outpatient treatment programs.8' A person who is committed pursu-
80 Contrast this statute and the absence of the phrase "sexually violent" with the statute at
issue in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
81 This approach would be similar to the "depenalization model" of criminal justice that sev-
eral European countries have moved toward in recent decades. The depenalization model is
based on the premise that the regular criminal justice system, with its focus on imprisonment, is
overly harsh and ineffective for dealing with non-serious offenses. In place of incarceration,
non-serious offenders are subjected to sanctions including fines, community service, and repa-
ration to the victim. Additionally, cases are diverted from the criminal justice system into alter-
native systems such as administrative proceedings, civil courts, and mediation courts. See
Miximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 60-61 (2004) (describ-
ing the features of the depenalization model).
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ant to the Act can only be released if, at the time of the yearly review,
a team of mental health professionals and a judge determine that he
or she no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that renders him
or her a danger to others.
B. Federalism and Criminal Justice
Apart from the Hendricks decision itself, support for State X's au-
thority to implement the Act is found in the notion of federalism.
Generally speaking, federalism may be defined as "the relationship
between two constitutionally grounded kinds of political communi-
ties and governments, typically a central or national government and
local or regional governments.,12 In the United States, federalism in-
volves the relationship between the federal government and the vari-
ous state governments. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
waged a revolution in the jurisprudence of federalism that has re-
emphasized the nature of our government as one of dual sovereignty
and transferred power from the national government to the state
governments.8
s
A full review of federalism is beyond the scope of this paper. For
the purposes of this paper, it suffices to note that the concept of fed-
eralism imposes significant limitations on the federal government's
ability to intervene in state criminal justice processes. The Supreme
Court has, in recent years, demonstrated a growing reluctance to al-
low the federal government to infringe upon the authority of the
states, Ryarticularly in areas where states have historically had sover-
eignty.
Justice Black provided perhaps the most widely regarded explana-
tion of federalism in his opinion in Younger v. Harris."5 According to
Justice Black, our system of federalism requires:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the en-
tire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
86functions in their separate ways.
82 RobertJustin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REV. 93, 97 n.9 (2004).
83 Id. at 95 n.4 (stating that the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist, "'has en-
gaged in a far-reaching reappraisal of the scope of Congressional authority and the balance of
powers between the national government and the states"') (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Will the
Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001 (Week in Review), at 14).
84 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a
federal statute that provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that
made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone).
85 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
86 Id. at 44.
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In Younger, Justice Black invoked the concept of federalism to prevent
federal courts from issuing injunctions in pending state criminal
prosecutions. The Court's reluctance to interfere in state criminal
justice systems is evident in other contexts as well. For example, in
Patterson v. New York, 7 the Court found that states have wide discre-
tion to define the elements of a crime and affirmative defenses. The
Patterson Court noted that "preventing and dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Gov-
ernment."s
The Supreme Court has also limited the ability of Congress to in-
terfere with state criminal justice systems. In United States v. Lopez 9
and United States v. Morrison,90 Justice Rehnquist established a new
framework to analyze Congress's authority to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. Under this new framework, Congress may not
regulate non-economic, violent crime based solely on its aggregate
effect on interstate commerce. 9 In Lopez, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm ... at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone. 92 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, held that Congress did not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the possession of guns in school zones.
Justice Rehnquist found that the Act was a criminal statute having
nothing to do with commerce or any type of economic enterprise.9'
In Morrison, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, which provided a federal civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence.94 Applying the framework ar-
ticulated in Lopez, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the
Act could not be upheld under the Commerce Clause even though it
was supported by extensive legislative findings regarding the effects
87 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
88 Id. at 201; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (emphasizing the Supreme
Court's "established practice, rooted in federalism, of allowing the States wide discretion, sub-
ject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solu-
tions to difficult problems of policy" in the area of criminal justice, and collecting cases support-
ing this proposition).
89 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
90 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
91 Id. at 617.
92 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2(q) (2) (A) (2000).
93 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Justice Rehnquist cites Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993), for the proposition that "'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law.'" Id. (further internal citations omitted).
94 42 U.S.C. § 13981 et. seq. (2000).
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of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. 5 According to
Justice Rehnquist, regulation and punishment of intrastate violence
has always been the province of the States .... Indeed, we can think of
no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of its victims. 96
The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence suggests that the
federal courts and Congress should not interfere with a state's crimi-
nal justice process, which has traditionally been considered an area of
state sovereignty. Under our federalist structure, states retain wide
authority to fashion their criminal justice systems as they see fit.
Taken to its logical extreme, the concept of federalism may be read
to support the thesis that a state could abolish its criminal justice sys-
tem and replace it with an alternative system of social control featur-
ing involuntary civil commitment as its primary mechanism. 97
V. STATE X HYPOTHETICAL: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXPANSION OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
The foregoing analysis of federalism in the area of criminal justice
suggests that states have wide authority to fashion the rules of their
criminal justice systems, without interference from federal courts and
Congress. State X's decision to implement a new system of social
control should be upheld as valid, unless a challenger can demon-
strate that it runs afoul of some affirmative, fundamental principle of
justice rooted in the Constitution. The Hendricks decision virtually
forecloses a challenge to State X's definition of mental abnormality. 9
This section of the comment explores the basis for other types of po-
tential constitutional challenges to the Civil Commitment Act.
95 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
96 Id. at 618. Recent precedent suggests that the Supreme Court is unwilling to further ex-
tend the reasoning of Lopez and Morrison and thereby entirely overturn its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Last term, the Court held that the federal Controlled Substances Act could be
applied to intrastate users and growers of marijuana for medical purposes as authorized by Cali-
fornia's Compassionate Use Act. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). The Court distin-
guished Lopez and Morrison on two grounds. First, those cases involved a challenge to a particu-
lar statute or provision in its entirety, while the plaintiffs in Gonzales sought to "excise individual
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme." Id. at 2209. Second, the activities regu-
lated by the Controlled Substances Act are "quintessentially economic," whereas those activities
at issue in Lopez and Morrison were not. Id. at 2211. The Court rejected California's attempt to
isolate the intrastate cultivation, use, and possession of marijuana for medical purposes as be-
yond the reach of federal power, because this activity could have a substantial effect on the in-
terstate market for marijuana. Id. at 2212.
97 The Gonzales case suggests that the Supreme Court may be unwilling to extend federalism
far enough to support this type of experimentation.
98 See supra Part II.
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A. Retribution and Deterrence
The goals of retribution and deterrence are reserved solely for the
criminal justice system, and cannot be adopted by a civil commitment
system.' Therefore, in order for the Civil Commitment Act to be
constitutional, State X must make clear that it is officially abandoning
the goals of retribution and deterrence. This suggests an important
argument that can potentially limit the expansion of involuntary civil
commitment. It is possible to argue that a state cannot abolish its
criminal justice system because the state has an obligation to further
the goals of retribution and deterrence. According to this reasoning,
by abolishing its criminal justice system and replacing it with a civil
commitment system, State X has abdicated its responsibility to punish
and deter lawbreakers, and this is unjustifiable.
If valid, this argument would effectively doom the Civil Commit-
ment Act, because it would place State X in an impossible predica-
ment. State X could not legitimately use civil commitment as a
mechanism for retribution and deterrence, but State X has a respon-
sibility to further the goals of retribution and deterrence, so it could
not abolish its criminal justice system.
The main problem with the argument relates back to federalism.
Federalism teaches that states have broad authority to design and im-
plement their criminal justice systems.' °° This authority would seem-
ingly allow a state to decide that it will not have a criminal justice sys-
tem at all. Such a decision would be valid unless it can somehow be
shown that states are constitutionally required to have a criminal jus-
tice system. Since the goals of retribution and deterrence are re-
served solely for the criminal justice system,' 1 the question really be-
comes whether retribution and deterrence are constitutionally
required aspects of the state police power.
Retribution and deterrence are, of course, not mentioned any-
where in the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does include several
provisions relating to crime. For example, the Fifth Amendment
provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime" unless on indictment of a grand jury, "be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb," or "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.', 0 2 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, in all criminal trials,
the accused has the right to a "speedy and public trial, by an impartial
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[R]etribution and ... deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.").
100 See supra Part 1V.B.
101 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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jury," "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," "to
be confronted with ... witnesses," and "to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."' 3 And finally, the Eighth Amendment pro-
vides that no "cruel and unusual punishments" shall be inflicted.
1 0 4
Therefore, the writers of the Constitution clearly envisioned that
some system of criminal justice would be in place.
However, the original Bill of Rights applied only to the federal
government, and not to the states, so it cannot be argued that the
Constitution requires the states to have a system of criminal justice.
Moreover, as a historical matter, it is implausible to contend that the
writers of the Constitution intended for the states to have anything
akin to a contemporary criminal justice system, because there simply
was nothing similar to a modern system at the time of the founding
and it would have been impossible for the founders to contemplate
such a system.'06 For instance, there were no public prosecutors at
the time of founding.1°7 Prosecution was effected by either the crime
victim, the constable, or a private attorney acting as temporary public
advocate.0 8  Professional police also did not exist.'00  Substantive
criminal law had limited significance because juries decided the law
on an ad hoc basis."0 Finally, penitentiaries had not yet been
adopted in this country, so incarceration was rare."' In short, the ba-
sic features of the modern criminal justice system did not exist at the
time of the founding. For these reasons, it is implausible to argue
that the original Constitution required the states to create criminal
justice systems to satisfy the goals of retribution and deterrence.
Most provisions of the Bill of Rights have since been incorporated
by the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
103 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
105 See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (stating that
"[t]he constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for them-
selves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states").
106 See generally RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 72-73
(2001) (providing a history of the American criminal justice system).
107 See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 80-89 (1992)
(describing broadly the criminal law and procedure of colonial America).
1o8 Id. (explaining the varying methods of criminal procedure in early colonial America).
109 Id.
110 See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background ofJohn Marshall's ConstitutionalJu-
risprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904 (1978) (noting that juries, not judges, decided almost all
criminal cases in eighteenth century colonial America).
I See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 111, 114-15 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (recount-
ing the history of the penitentiary in the United States and stating that incarceration was not
widely used in America until the 1820s and 1830s).
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Amendment.1 1 2 It can perhaps be argued that, although the original
Constitution did not contemplate state systems of criminal justice, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did, and therefore the Con-
stitution, as altered by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the
states have a system of criminal justice in place that satisfies the goals
of retribution and deterrence. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, public prosecutors, police forces, and pris-
ons were common, and the criminal justice system was similar to the
system in place today.1 13  However, this argument is not persuasive
when one considers the intended purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."1  The purpose of this language is clearly to limit the state's
police powers. Therefore, the more proper interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that it was intended to allow the courts to
place limitations on state criminal justice systems that had emerged,
by requiring that they abide by "due process of law" when depriving
persons of their liberty. " 5 From this perspective, the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be read to somehow constitutionalize the mod-
ern criminal justice system and the goals that it serves. Ultimately
then, State X is not mandated by the Constitution to adopt any par-
ticular penological goals, and can choose to abandon retribution and
deterrence and focus on incapacitation instead.
1 1 6
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..1 . 7
12 See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 n.11 (1970) (Black,J., dissenting) (stating that, since
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held almost all of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, and citing cases).
13 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 72-73 (noting that the criminal justice system of 1868
and the contemporary criminal justice system share most basic features).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (interpreting the phrase "due proc-
ess of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the actions of the states to the same extent
that Fifth Amendment due process restrains the federal government).
J6 justice Kennedy recognized that the Constitution does not require adoption of any par-
ticular penological theory in his concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
This case dealt with the principle of "proportionality" in criminal sentencing. In concluding
that a mandatory life sentence for possession of cocaine did not violate the proportionality
principle, Justice Kennedy observed that state legislatures have the responsibility to make fun-
damental choices concerning the objectives of the penal system. Id. at 999. The Eighth
Amendment "does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory." Id. Accordingly,
"federal and state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to the pe-
nological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." Id.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that civil commitment
represents a substantial deprivation of liberty that requires due proc-
ess protections." 8 In Addington v. Texas," 9 the Supreme Court identi-
fied the standard of proof that must be satisfied before a state can
constitutionally commit a mentally ill person. The appellant in
Addington was indefinitely committed to a mental hospital pursuant to
Texas law after his mother filed a commitment petition.12 Addington
had a long history of temporary confinements for mental and emo-
tional disorders, had been involved in several assaultive episodes, and
had caused substantial property damage to his home and his parents'
home.
12 1
At trial, the state offered the opinions of two psychiatric experts,
who testified that Addington suffered from psychotic schizophrenia
and was probably dangerous to himself and others.'22  Addington
conceded that he suffered from a mental illness, but argued that
there was no substantial basis to conclude that he was dangerous.'
2 3
The trial court instructed the jury to determine whether, based on
"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," Addington was men-
tally ill and required hospitalization "for his own welfare and protec-
tion or the protection of others."' 24 Addington objected to these in-
structions, contending that the trial court should have employed the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof.2 5 The Texas Court
of Civil Appeals reversed on the standard of proof issue.126 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial
court's judgment, finding that a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard of proof was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.1
7
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard is the proper standard of proof
for civil commitment proceedings. In Addington, the Court examined
the continuum of standards of proof and the cases with which they
are associated. In ordinary civil suits, the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard applies because "society has a minimal concern with
the outcome of such private suits," and the litigants equally "share the
I1I See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (stating that "[f]reedom from bodily
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action").
119 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
120 Id. at 420.
121 Id. at 420-21.
122 Id. at 421.
123 Id.
124 Id.
12 Id. at 421-22.
16 Id. at 422.
17 Id.
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risk of error.' 2  The Court then compared these civil cases with
criminal cases, which mandate the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard because the interests of the defendant are so important that
they have historically been protected by "standards of proof designed





The Court recognized that "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due proc-
ess protection." For this reason, and because civil commitment can
result in substantial stigma to the committed person, the individual's
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is suffi-
ciently important to justify a standard higher than mere preponder-
ance of the evidence. 3' However, the Court rejected Addington's
contention that due process requires that the "beyond a reasonable
doubt standard" be used in civil commitment proceedings.
The Court began by emphasizing that the state has a legitimate in-
terest in civil commitment pursuant to both its parens patriae and po-
lice power, thus distinguishing civil commitment from criminal incar-
ceration. 13 2  Next, the Court identified several reasons why the
standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding should differ
from the standard in a criminal prosecution. 3 3 First, a civil commit-
ment proceeding is not punitive in nature. 34 Second, the "beyond a
reasonable doubt standard" has traditionally been reserved for crimi-
nal cases, and should not be extended to other types of cases.135 This
standard reflects the desire to minimize the risk of error, even if some
guilty persons go free. Even though erroneous confinement should
be avoided, the risk of erroneous confinement is not as serious be-
cause of review and observation by mental health professionals, and
because family and friends will ensure that erroneous commitment
will be detected.16 Finally, the inquiry in a civil commitment pro-ceeding differs significantly from the inquiry in a criminal trial in that
128 Id. at 423.
129 Id.
1o Id. at 425.
131 Id. at 427.
132 Id. at 426. The Court refers to the state's interests under its parens patriae powers as the
interest "in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care
for themselves." Id. The Court also notes that the state "has authority under its police power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill." Id. In
criminal cases, a state acts under the authority of its police powers, but its parens patriae powers
are not implicated.
13s Id. at 428.
134 Id.
135 Id.
1s6 Id. at 428-29.
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it requires evaluation and diagnosis by mental health experts.
13
1
"Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis,
there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous." 3 8 Therefore, the Court settled on the inter-
mediate standard of proof, requiring the state in a civil commitment
proceeding to prove mental illness and dangerousness by "clear and
convincing evidence. '3 9
The implications of Addington for State X are clear. In order to
commit an individual under the Civil Commitment Act, the state
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual suf-
fers from a mental abnormality and is presently dangerous.140 These
procedural due process requirements should not be overly difficult to
comply with, and so long as they are met, Addington poses no barrier
to commitment under the Act. First, given the Act's expansive defini-
tion of mental abnormality, it should not be difficult for State X to
produce experts willing to testify that a given individual suffers from a
mental abnormality. Second, State X should have little difficulty
proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in most
cases. Those offenders currently in prison have a history of criminal
convictions, and other individuals who will be targeted are those that
have committed a violent act which qualifies as a "commitment
predicate." As a practical matter, the factfinder is likely to credit past
violence as evidence of present dangerousness, unless there is com-
pelling evidence that the individual is unlikely to continue to commit
violent acts in the future.
One question that will arise is the standard of proof required for
the determination of whether an individual actually committed a
"commitment predicate." In this respect, the Act adds an additional
137 Id. at 429.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 431-33. The Court noted that, consistent with the essence of federalism, states are
free to adopt more stringent standards of proof if they wish. Id. at 431-32.
140 There may be additional procedural requirements that would have to be satisfied prior to
commitment. The Supreme Court has not precisely delineated all of the procedural protec-
tions that are necessary in the commitment context. Sexual predator statutes typically include
extensive procedural requirements that must be met before an individual can be committed
indefinitely. For example, the Kansas SVPA provides a wide array of procedural protections
typical of the criminal rather than the civil process, including a probable cause determination, a
trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the individual in question is a sexually
violent predator, assistance of counsel and an examination by mental health professionals for
indigents at public expense, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the opportu-
nity to review documentary evidence presented by the state. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 352-53 (1997) (listing the procedural protections included in the Kansas SVPA). Of
course, the Civil Commitment Act would be modeled after existing sexual predator statutes,
and would therefore include extensive procedural requirements more than sufficient to satisfy
due process standards in the commitment context.
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layer of inquiry onto the civil commitment proceeding that is more
akin to the inquiry required in a criminal trial in that it is a factual in-
vestigation focusing upon whether the individual committed the act
alleged. 4 ' Therefore, there is a good argument that the "proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard should apply in making the de-
termination of whether the individual committed a "commitment
predicate." On the other hand, the other rationales cited in Adding-
ton still apply in this context. A proceeding under the Act is civil,
rather than punitive in nature. Also, it can still be contended that the
risk of erroneous commitment is not as serious as the risk of errone-
ous conviction.1
C. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court in Hendricks emphatically rejected the argu-
ment that commitment under the Kansas SVPA violated Hendricks'
substantive due process rights.4 3 Various commentators have noted
that the Court's decision in this area disregarded precedent estab-
lished just a few years earlier in Foucha v. Louisiana.4 4  Foucha was
charged with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.
The trial court found Foucha not guilty by reason of insanity.145 Lou-
isiana law provided that a defendant in a criminal case found not
guilty by reason of insanity be committed to a mental hospital unless
he could prove he was not dangerous. 46  Louisiana law further pro-
vided that the individual would remain committed until he was able
141 According to the Court, the basic issue in criminal cases involves a "straightforward factual
question-did the accused commit the act alleged?" Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
142 This argument is somewhat more difficult to make in this context than it was in Addington.
The Court in Addington reasoned that review by professionals and concern by family members
would ensure that erroneous commitments would be detected. 441 U.S. at 428-29. It may be
easy to detect an erroneous commitment when dealing with a person alleged to be suffering
from a serious mental illness like schizophrenia, the symptoms of which are easily detectable.
However, given the amorphousness of the definition of mental abnormality, the chances of pro-
fessionals concluding that a conviction was erroneous would appear to be slimmer. Also, there
will probably be less sympathy for persons who have committed serious violent offenses. More-
over, given the required finding of a "commitment predicate," stigma that attaches to commit-
ment under the Act is likely to be greater than the stigma that ordinarily attaches to being
committed for mental illness. Accord Krongard, supra note 46, at 130 (arguing that "civil com-
mitment for the purpose of protecting the public bears a stronger resemblance to criminal in-
carceration than to commitment for the benefit of the committed" in the context of Kansas v.
Hendricks).
143 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
504 U.S. 71 (1992). See, e.g., Krongard, supra note 46, at 130 (noting that the Court in
Hendricks reiterated the holding of Foucha but failed to establish why sex offenders committed
pursuant to the SVPA should be treated differently than the appellant in Foucha, who was diag-
nosed with antisocial personality disorder).
145 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74.
146 Id. at 73.
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to prove at release proceedings that he was not dangerous. If found
dangerous, the individual would be returned to the mental hospital
whether or not he was mentally ill.
1 47
Foucha was committed pursuant to this procedure. Four years
later, the superintendent of the mental hospital where Foucha was
confined recommended that he be discharged or released. Pursuant
to state law, the trial judge appointed a "sanity commission" to de-
termine if Foucha remained dangerous.'48 One of the doctors testi-
fied that Foucha probably suffered from a "drug induced psychosis"
when committed but that he had recovered from that condition, and
that he showed no signs of psychosis or neurosis.149 The doctor fur-
ther testified that Foucha had antisocial personality disorder, an un-
treatable mental condition. 5 0  The commission's report concluded
that Foucha's mental illness was in remission, but was unable to cer-
tify that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or others if re-
leased. 15' Following the hearing, the court found that Foucha was
dangerous and ordered that he be returned to the mental hospital.'
2
The state Court of Appeals and Supreme Court both affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that Foucha's
continued commitment violated due process. Justice White, writing
for the majority, relied on Jones v. United States and O'Connor v.
Donaldson'5 for the proposition that an insanity acquittee must be re-
leased when he is no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.
55
The testimony at Foucha's release proceedings established that he no
longer suffered from a mental illness.156 Therefore, one of the pre-
requisites for civil commitment was no longer present. Justice White
rejected the state's reliance on Foucha's antisocial personality disor-
der as justification for his continued confinement. According to Jus-
tice White, the state's rationale would allow it to indefinitely confine
any insanity acquittee who had a personality disorder that may lead to
criminal conduct, as well as any convicted criminal. 7 Such a system
147 Id.
148 Id. at 74.
149 Id. at 75.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 74-75.
52 Id. at 75.
153 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
14 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
15 The Court in Jones held that "(t)he committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous." 463 U.S. at 368. In Donaldson, the Court held
that it violated due process for a state to continue to confine a mentally ill person who was no
longer dangerous. 422 U.S. at 575.
'56 Antisocial personality disorder is classified as a personality disorder, which is distinct from
a mental illness. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 48, at 648.
157 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83.
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"would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for
dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow excep-
tions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, in-
carcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to
have violated a criminal law."' 8
The Court's opinion in Foucha could be interpreted as requiring
civil commitment to be predicated upon a finding of mental illness,
as opposed to a personality disorder. Of course, the Court specifi-
cally rejected this interpretation in Hendricks. Therefore, the ques-
tion must be asked whether anything in Foucha survives Hendricks.
The Court in Hendricks did not expressly overrule Foucha. Rather, it
found the Kansas SVPA to be consistent with Foucha, which it recog-
nized as holding that involuntary civil commitment statutes are con-
stitutional if confinement takes place "pursuant to proper procedures
and evidentiary standards., 159 Although this reasoning seems some-
what disingenuous, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha sug-
gests a possible basis for reconciliation of the two cases. Justice
O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that Louisiana's
commitment procedure for insanity acquittees violated due process,
but she wrote separately to emphasize that more narrowly drawn stat-
utes providing for confinement of insanity acquittees may pass consti-
tutional muster.'6 Thus, "it might therefore be permissible for Lou-
isiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity
if ... the nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect
pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing
dangerousness. 161
Consistent with Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Kansas SVPA
could be regarded as sufficiently narrow to satisfy due process re-
quirements, in that it applies only to a small subclass of sexually vio-
lent offenders. Under this interpretation, Foucha could not be con-
fined on the basis of antisocial personality disorder because this
disorder does not sufficiently narrow the class of persons subject to
confinement, but Hendricks could be confined on the basis of pedo-
philia because he fit into a sufficiently narrow subset of offenders and
his detention was tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns
related to his continuing dangerousness. On this theory, pure pre-
ventative detention based on dangerousness is unacceptable if not
sufficiently limited.
Assuming this interpretation of Foucha's continuing vitality is cor-
rect, the question that immediately arises is what the limiting mecha-
15 Id. at 83.
159 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
160 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86-87 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
161 Id. at 87-88.
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nism is that makes preventive detention on the basis of dangerous-
ness constitutionally acceptable. In other words, what is the principle
upon which Foucha and Hendricks can be distinguished? Justice Tho-
mas's opinion in Hendricks suggested that the operative limiting
mechanism is lack of control: "The precommitment requirement of
a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the
requirements of ... other statutes that we have upheld in that it nar-
rows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are
unable to control their dangerousness."62
The Court further confused the lack of control requirement in
Kansas v. Crane,16 a case arising from another commitment under the
Kansas SVPA. Crane was a convicted sex offender who was diagnosed
with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.1 64 Following a
jury trial, the Kansas district court ordered that Crane be civilly com-
mitted as a sexual violent predator pursuant to the Kansas SVPA1
65
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process re-
quires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous be-
havior.1
6
On appeal, the Supreme Court discussed and ultimately constitu-
tionalized the lack of control requirement. The Court concluded
that Hendricks did not require that an individual have a total or abso-
lute lack of control in order to be civilly committed as a sexually vio-
lent predator. 167 On the other hand, neither did Hendricks allow
commitment absent any lack of control determination. Instead, such
a determination was necessary to distinguish "a dangerous sexual of-
fender subject to civil commitment" from other dangerous people
who should be dealt with through the criminal justice system. 6
After stating that a lack of control finding was necessary to distin-
guish sexual predators from other types of offenders, the Court pro-
ceeded to define the standard to be used. According to the Court,
"lack of control" can be demonstrated by "proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior.' ' 69 This proof, viewed in the context of the
case, "must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted
in an ordinary criminal case.1
7 0
162 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
165 534 U.S. 407 (2002).




1 Id. at 412.
169 Id. at 413.
170 Id.
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Finally, the Court addressed the import of the distinction between
mental abnormality characterized by an "emotional impairment" and
a mental abnormality involving a "volitional impairment." The Court
noted that most dangerous sexual offenders who are civilly commit-
ted will, like Hendricks, have a volitional impairment that makes it
particularly difficult for them to control their behavior. 7 ' However,
the Hendricks Court did not draw a clear distinction between voli-
tional and purely emotional mental abnormalities. The Court like-
wise declined to consider whether confinement based solely on "emo-
tional" abnormality would be constitutional. 
72
In declining to consider the constitutionality of confinement
based on emotional abnormality alone, the Court sidestepped a fun-
damentally important issue regarding the constitutional scope of civil
commitment. Recall that the Court in Foucha held that Foucha could
not be confined on the basis of dangerousness combined with a di-
agnosis of antisocial personality disorder. The Court in Crane ulti-
mately failed to determine whether Crane, who also suffered from
antisocial personality disorder, could be committed, and instead va-
cated and remanded to the state court. However, the Court's reason-
ing does suggest that an individual with antisocial personality disor-
der, or any other "emotional" or "cognitive" impairment, could be
constitutionally committed so long as that impairment caused a suffi-
ciently serious control problem. Therefore, the Court stripped
Foucha of much of its significance without explicitly acknowledging
that it was doing so, and moved a step closer to sanctioning the sys-
tem of pure preventive confinement that the Foucha Court was wor-
ried about.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the lack of control standard
will ultimately not impose a significant constitutional barrier to State
X's implementation of its civil commitment system. The Court in
Crane constitutionaized the lack of control standard as a prerequisite
to civil commitment, but ultimately left the precise meaning of lack
of control open. Therefore, states have substantial discretion to de-
fine the lack of control standard, and it is unlikely that the Court will
strike down state definitions as unconstitutional. 7 Given this, State X
could commit a person suffering from, for instance, antisocial per-
sonality disorder, so long as there is a finding that the person has
171 Id. at 414-15.
1 Id. The Kansas Supreme Court found that Hendricks forbids the commitment of any per-
son suffering from an emotional impairment but not a volitional impairment.
173 See Morse, supra note 38, at 1033 ("Crane's vague definition of lack of control and its rec-
ognition that the states retain considerable leeway to define mental abnormality, and, presuma-
bly, also to define lack of control, imply that most state definitions will be constitutionally ac-
ceptable.").
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substantial difficulty controlling his behavior.7 4 Such a commitment
would most likely be upheld as constitutional notwithstanding Foucha.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the lack of control standard is
unlikely to impose much limitation on commitment from the per-
spective of the factfinder. The primary evidence that a state will put
on to support a finding of lack of control will be evidence of prior
convictions for violent offenses, along with psychiatric testimony es-
tablishing that the individual sought to be committed is likely to con-
tinue offending in the future. Ultimately, the factfinder will probably
credit past violent behavior both as an accurate predictor of danger-
ousness and evidence of an inability to control behavior.'7 5 Because
the persons that State X is likely to target under the Civil Commit-
ment Act will be repeat offenders with a history of violent and antiso-
cial behaviors, the factfinder will probably have little difficultly find-
ing the requisite "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,"
and indeed, the lack of control determination may well collapse into
the dangerousness determination.'7 ;
D. Right to Treatment
The Court's most definitive statement regarding the constitutional
right to treatment in the civil commitment context was announced in
Youngberg v. Romeo.'77  Romeo was a mentally retarded individual
committed to a state facility in Pennsylvania. Romeo was injured sev-
eral times as a result of his own violence as well as attacks by other
residents. 78  His mother filed suit on his behalf under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 79 claiming that the facility was violating his constitutional
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to
institute proper procedures to prevent injuries to him and failing to
174 Indeed, courts after Crane have upheld the involuntary commitment of sexual offenders
with antisocial personality disorder. For example, in Adams v. Bartow, 330 F.3d 957, 962-63 (7th
Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit upheld commitment of a sexual offender suffering from antiso-
cial personality disorder based upon a finding that that he was "substantially probable" to com-
mit another sexually violent offense given his long history of sexually violent crimes, non-sexual
crimes and antisocial behavior, failure under supervision, denial of responsibility, refusal to par-
ticipate in treatment programs, and sex offense recidivism. This record was sufficient for the
trial court to find that Adams suffered from a mental disorder that distinguished him from the
"'typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.'" Id. at 963 (quoting Crane, 534 U.S.
at 413).
175 Cf American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 11 (1982), re-
printed in G. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 200 (2d ed. 1997)
("'The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper
than that between twilight and dusk'").
176 Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
177 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
178 Id. at 310.
M 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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provide him with proper treatment programs for his mental retarda-
tion."' The Court found that Romeo had a "constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in safety and freedom from restraint," and rec-
ognized that treatment may be necessary to safeguard against
violations of that liberty interest.18' Therefore, the Court concluded
that the state was required "to provide minimally adequate or reason-
able training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.'
8 2
However, the Court was careful to limit its holding to the specific
facts of Romeo's case, and refused to announce a general constitu-
tional right to treatment. 3
Youngberg makes clear that there is a constitutional right to treat-
ment in certain circumstances, but the Court's decision is vague as to
what circumstances are included. If the Court were to recognize a
general right to treatment for civilly committed persons, this would
provide the basis for a serious challenge to the Civil Commitment
Act. The Act allows for the commitment of dangerous offenders suf-
fering from mental abnormalities, like antisocial personality disorder,
that are untreatable.18 4 Obviously, if a person with an untreatable
condition is committed and there is a constitutional right to treat-
ment, the basis for that commitment is constitutionally problematic.
In such instances, commitment would seem to be pure preventive de-
tention, which the Court has consistently rejected, because the com-
mitted individual would never have the opportunity to be released.'85
The Hendricks Court was forced to address this problem because
the Kansas Supreme Court had determined that treatment was not
possible for people with Hendricks' condition.8 6 Justice Thomas ini-
tially suggested that commitment solely for the purpose of incapacita-
tion is constitutionally acceptable. s7 However, he went on to say that
Hendricks' condition was in fact treatable and that treatment was an
"ancillary goal" of the Kansas SVPA.'"s Therefore, Justice Thomas
180 Romeo, 457 U.S. at 310-11.
181 Id. at 318.
182 Id. at 319.
183 Id. at 318.
184 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992) (describing antisocial personality disorder
as a condition that is not a mental disease and is untreatable).
185 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (warning that
.the practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose confinement for life"); John Kip
Cornwell, supra note 46, at 404 ("If... a state may confine a 'mentally abnormal' individual
without regard to the availability or efficacy of psychiatric treatment, his detention may become,
in effect, a life sentence.").
186 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365 (quoting the Kansas Supreme Court, In re Hendricks, 912
P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)).
187 Id. at 365-66.
188 Id. at 366.
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avoided fully answering the question of whether truly untreatable
persons can be committed.
Ultimately then, the Supreme Court has not provided answers to
the crucial questions of whether there is a right to treatment in the
civil commitment context and whether a person with an untreatable
mental disorder or abnormality can be committed. However, Justice
Thomas's reasoning in Hendricks certainly suggests that it would be
unlikely for the Civil Commitment Act to be struck down on this ba-
sis. Additionally, the dissent in Hendricks explicitly stated that its
opinion would not "preclude a State from deciding that a certain
subset of people are mentally ill, dangerous, and untreatable, and
that confinement of this subset is therefore necessary."' 189 Therefore,
all nine Justices apparently believe that incapacitation alone justifies
the commitment of dangerous persons with untreatable mental dis-
orders. This logic can be extended to support State X's scheme of
involuntary commitment for all dangerous offenders with a "mental
abnormality."19
Alternatively, even if the Court were to find that State X must pro-
vide some degree of treatment, it surely seems permissible under
Hendricks for State X to implement a civil commitment system that
primarily seeks to incapacitate dangerous offenders but adopts treat-
ment as an ancillary goal, where treatment is available. Moreover,
even for those individuals suffering from conditions like antisocial
personality disorder that are essentially incurable, State X could le-
gitimately offer some form of treatment, such as behavioral modifica-
tion therapy, that would satisfy the "minimally adequate" standard es-
tablished in Youngberg.9' This is especially true given the Court's
statement in Hendricks that "States enjoy wide latitude in developing
treatment regimens."
1 92
E. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
The main debate between the majority and the dissent in
Hendricks focused upon whether commitment under the Kansas SVPA
was punitive and therefore violated the Ex Post Facto and Double
189 Id. at 390 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-09a02(b) (1994). Accord Cornwell, supra note 46, at 406 (stating
that the willingness of both the majority and the dissent in Hendricks to allow a state to detain
dangerous individuals with an untreatable mental disorder, "taken to the extreme, would allow
states to declare entire classes of dangerous mentally ill individuals 'untreatable' and leave them
to languish indefinitely in psychiatric hospitals").
191 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates minimally adequate training for involuntary commission to a state institution).
192 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 n.4.
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Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.'9 The majority deter-
mined that the SVPA was not punitive because 1) the state disavowed
any sort of punitive intent; 2) the Act did not implicate the goals of
retribution or deterrence; 3) the length of confinement was linked to
the purpose of the Act; 4) the state provided procedural safeguards
and provided those committed under the Act with the same status as
other persons who had been civilly committed; 5) confinement was
limited to a small group of particularly dangerous individuals; 6) the
Act recommended treatment when possible; and 7) the Act allowed
release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or
mentally impaired.
1 9 4
The dissent, in finding the SVPA punitive as applied to Hendricks,
focused upon the role of treatment. Justice Breyer argued that the
state had, in fact, conceded that Hendricks was treatable, and was
therefore obligated to provide him with treatment.' 95 By failing to of-
fer treatment to Hendricks until after his release from prison, and
then failing to provide available treatment after incapacitating him,
the state demonstrated a punitive intent.1 96 However, Justice Breyer
carefully limited his opinion to the facts of Hendricks' confinement,
and did not suggest that the entire statute was punitive and therefore
invalid.
Based upon the rationale of both the majority and dissent in
Hendricks, the Civil Commitment Act would probably not be consid-
ered punitive, so long as the Act is modeled after the Kansas SVPA,
establishes sufficient procedural safeguards, and provides some form
of treatment to treatable individuals. However, there is a critical ad-
ditional feature of the Civil Commitment Act that distinguishes it
from the Kansas SVPA and any other statute that has been enacted in
the United States. That feature is, of course, the provision abolishing
State X's present criminal justice system. The fact that the Civil
Commitment Act essentially creates a system of social control in-
tended to replace the criminal justice system significantly changes the
analysis, because it suggests that State X is utilizing civil commitment
to satisfy the goals that it had previously satisfied through its criminal
justice system. If civil commitment entirely replaces incarceration, it
193 The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Ex Post Facto
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, "'forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a
crime already consummated.'" Cal. Dept. of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
194 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
195 Id. at 390-91 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 390.
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is much more difficult to argue that the state is not acting with a pu-
nitive intent, in which case commitment would be invalid.
This is precisely what Justice Kennedy was concerned about in
writing his concurrence in Hendricks. Justice Kennedy recognized
that, although the Kansas SVPA is a civil statute, its practical effect
may be to impose lifelong confinement.8 Justice Kennedy then dis-
cussed the different goals of the civil and criminal systems of con-
finement. While both systems share the common goal of incapacita-
tion, "retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the
criminal system alone."' Therefore, civil commitment would not be
justified if it became "a mechanism for retribution or general deter-
rence."200 Justice Breyer also voiced this same concern in the Crane
opinion. He emphasized the constitutional importance of distin-
guishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment
from other dangerous persons who are more properly handled
through criminal proceedings, and said that this distinction is neces-
sary to prevent commitment from becoming a mechanism for retri-
bution and deterrence. 0'
Since State X is superseding its criminal justice system with a civil
commitment system, there is a strong argument that its civil system is
adopting the goals of the criminal justice system and becoming a
mechanism for retribution and deterrence. This is perhaps the best
argument for limiting the expansion of involuntary civil commitment.
But, it is unclear whether it would command a majority of the Court,
given the Court's general deference to a state's designation of a stat-
ute as civil.20 2 Therefore, a clear acknowledgement by State X that it
is officially abandoning the goals of retribution and deterrence and
entirely focusing upon incapacitation and treatment, where possible,
would probably suffice to establish the constitutionality of the Act.
F. Expanding Toward Preventive Detention
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that there is little standing in
the way of a massive expansion of civil commitment. Addington re-
quires that a state abide by particular procedural requirements before
civilly committing an individual, but these requirements can be satis-
197 This rationale would directly apply only to incarcerated offenders, and not those who are
committed after the Act goes into effect. There could be no ex post facto or double jeopardy
issue with regard to the latter class of offenders because they were not previously punished for
their offenses.
198 Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 373.
200 Id.
201 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002).
202 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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fied fairly easily.23 The Hendricks decision virtually forecloses chal-
lenges to civil commitment statutes based upon substantive due proc-
ess, ex post facto and double jeopardy, or right to treatment. 20 4 Crane
seemingly provides a limiting principle by requiring the state to dem-
onstrate "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior" as a pre-
requisite to commitment.205 However, close scrutiny of this standard
reveals that it is nearly as vacuous as Kansas's definition of mental ab-
normality. Creative arguments can be made regarding retribution
and deterrence, but these arguments appear to have little constitu-
tional basis and probably would not be accepted by a majority of the
Court.
Ultimately, what the State X hypothetical really represents is the
culmination of a massive theoretical shift that is evident in the Su-
preme Court's civil commitment jurisprudence. °0 In Foucha, the
Court clearly rejected pure preventive detention on the basis of dan-
gerousness. With the Hendricks decision, the Court did a one hun-
dred eighty degree turn and came quite close to sanctioning the very
system it had denounced in Foucha. Although the Court took a
couple of steps back in Crane, given the unwillingness of the Justices
to impose any meaningful substantive limitations on the expansion of
involuntary civil commitment, it seems as if the Court's approval of
pure preventive detention-or at least preventive detention with
treatment as an "ancillary goal"20-- could be on the horizon.
CONCLUSION
In the spirit of federalism, the Supreme Court has recognized that
states should be allowed wide discretion to experiment and discover
the most effective solutions to societal problems. 200 Recently, states
have begun to seek alternative methods to traditional criminal justice
to deal with the pervasive problem of criminal violence. One of the
methods that states have utilized is involuntary civil commitment.
Thus far, civil commitment has been reserved for a small category of
criminal offenders-those who are mentally ill and dangerous, and
those who have a mental abnormality that renders them likely to en-
203 See supra Part V.B.
204 See supra Parts I and II.
205 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
W6 Accord Robinson, supra note 50, at 1429 (noting that the focus of the justice system in re-
cent years has shifted from punishing past crimes to preventing future violations).
207 See supra Part V.C.
208 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
2W See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (recognizing the Supreme Court's "estab-
lished practice, rooted in federalism, of allowing the States wide discretion, subject to the
minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions to diffi-
cult problems of policy").
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gage in acts of sexual violence. However, Supreme Court jurispru-
dence suggests little constitutional impediment to the continued ex-
pansion of involuntary civil commitment.
In my view, an expanded civil commitment system should play a
more central role in our society. The criminal justice system should
be relegated to what the term "criminal justice" denotes-that is, it
should be in the business of doing justice. Legislatures and courts
should make an honest and legitimate attempt to affix punishments
on the basis of the offender's personal blameworthiness for the pre-
sent offense, without any consideration of past criminality or future
dangerousness. This would entail a rejection of "three-strikes" laws,
habitual-offender statutes, and sentencing guidelines that increase
sentences for offenders with criminal recrds. 210 It would also entail
far less use of incarceration and far more use of non-penal sanctions
and restorative methods. Incapacitation should be entirely divorced
from the criminal justice system.21 ' The goal of incapacitation is far
better served by civil commitment than by criminal punishment.
Meanwhile, civil commitment should be expanded to allow for
preventive detention on the basis of dangerousness. This system
would encompass every violent offender whose term of incarceration
has expired, as well as insanity acquittees and those found incompe-
tent to stand trial. Every such offender would undergo a proceeding
to determine his or her dangerousness, accompanied by appropriate
procedural safeguards. Upon a finding of dangerousness, the indi-
vidual would be civilly committed subject to periodic review, or, if ap-
propriate, subjected to a less restrictive form of incapacitation.
Many people may be concerned about the ramifications of my
proposal. For some, civil commitment invokes "images of crowded
psychiatric hospitals filled with patients suffering from nebulous psy-
chiatric ailments for which there is no available treatment because
210 See Robinson, supra note 50, at 1435 (describing these types of statutes as distortions of
justice because they dramatically increase sentences under the guise of punishment when they
are truly preventive detention mechanisms).
211 This proposal is similar to Professor Robinson's suggestion that justice and prevention
should be segregated into two systems, a criminal justice system focused upon imposing pun-
ishment proportionate to the offense, and a post-sentence civil commitment system focused
upon incapacitating dangerous offenders. Id. at 1454-55. Professor Robinson's proposal has
not gone without criticism. Professor Morse argues that a system of preventive detention may
be acceptable theoretically, but would be unjustifiable in practice because methods of predict-
ing dangerousness are too inaccurate. Morse, supra note 38, at 1026-27 n.5. Professor Morse
also contends that the protections of indefinite commitment would not effectively safeguard
liberty. Id. However, Professor Morse argues elsewhere that pure preventive detention can be
justified when the "risk of serious harn is grave." Morse, supra note 49, at 266; see also Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Par-
ticular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 85 (1996) (sug-
gesting that civil detention is permissible as a "gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal
process cannot address").
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they allegedly render the patients dangerous."2 12 So long as appropri-
ate procedural protections are in place, such a system will not be-
come a reality. Civil commitment will be reserved for a relatively
small set of antisocial offenders who pose a serious threat to public
safety. Is such a system really worse than the one we have now, where
a person convicted of stealing $100 or writing a bad check can be in-
carcerated in brutal conditions for years and face the prospect of
rape and violent death on a daily basis? 213 Separating the criminal jus-
tice system from the civil commitment system by having the former
focus on retribution and the latter on incapacitation can lead to
greater justice and enhanced community safety. This type of dual sys-
tem would not run afoul of the Constitution. Instead, it would reflect
the spirit of federalism that the Constitution embraces.
212 Comwell, supra note 46, at 404.
2 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence un-
der a "recidivist" statute for the crime of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses).
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